If a final building permit is abrogated because of the abrogation of the implementing planning document in proceedings to determine constitutionality and legitimacy before the constitutional court and this is a consequence of unlawful action by the municipality or by the state, if the spatial planning document was adopted by a body thereof, the investor shall have the right to the reimbursement of ordinary damages and lost profit for the damage incurred thereby because of the trust in the final building permit.

On the day this act enters into force, the reconstruction of national highways pursuant to the provisions of Article 28 of the Public Roads Act (Ur. l. RS, Nos. 29/97 and 50/2002 [constitutional court ruling]), the reconstruction of railways pursuant to the provisions of Article 20 of the Safety of Railway Transport Act (Ur. l. RS, No. 85/2000) and renovation and other maintenance works on national highways and railways defined in the aforementioned acts of law or implementing regulations issued on the basis thereof shall be deemed maintenance works of public benefit.

If other legal protection is not provided, the court having jurisdiction to review administrative acts also decides on the legality of individual actions and acts which intrude upon the constitutional rights of the individual.

(3) In an administrative dispute, the court shall adjudicate on the legality of individual acts and actions which interfere with the constitutional rights of an individual, unless a different form of due process has been guaranteed.

Paragraph 3 states the general principle of proportionality between penalties and criminal offences which is enshrined in the common constitutional traditions of the Member States and in the case law of the Court of Justice of the Communities.

Having entered a reservation in respect of the European Convention on Extradition of 1957 to the effect that it will not grant extradition of persons wanted for an offence punishable by a life sentence or detention order, Portugal states that where extradition is sought for an offence punishable by a life sentence or detention order, it will grant extradition, in compliance with the relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, as interpreted by its Constitutional Court, only if it regards as sufficient the assurances given by the requesting Member State that it will encourage, in accordance with its law and practice regarding the carrying out of sentences, the application of any measures of clemency to which the person whose extradition is requested might be entitled.

In case any or all of the High Contracting Parties parties to such a dispute should not be Parties to the Protocol bearing the date of December 16(th), 1920, relating to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the dispute shall be referred, at the choice of the parties and in accordance with the constitutional procedure of each party, either to the Permanent Court of International Justice or to a court of arbitration constituted in accordance with the Convention of October 18th, 1907, for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, or to some other court of arbitration.

(I) The court may, in an administrative dispute from the third paragraph of Article 1 of this Law, establish that the act or action is illegal, ban the continuation of individual actions, decide on the plaintiffs request to be reimbursed for damages, and order, when necessary, the removal of a violation of constitutional rights and the re-establishment of a legal state of affairs.

This Charter reaffirms, with due regard for the powers and tasks of the Union and the principle of subsidiarity, the rights as they result, in particular, from the constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member States, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Social Charters adopted by the Union and by the Council of Europe and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and of the European Court of Human Rights.

The rule of interpretation contained in paragraph 4 has been based on the wording of Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union (cf. now the wording of Article I-9(3) of the Constitution) and takes due account of the approach to common constitutional traditions followed by the Court of Justice (e.g., judgment of 13 December 1979, Case 44/79 Hauer [1979] ECR 3727; judgment of 18 May 1982, Case 155/79, AM&S, [1982] ECR 1575).

19 Ruling of the Constitutional Court No. up-20/93, 19 June 1997

The journalist filed a suit against this decision and lost, but he lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court.

22 Ruling of the Constitutional Court U-I-172/94 of 9 November 1994 (Odlus III, 123) and Ruling of the Constitutional Court U-I-226/95 of 8 July 1999 (Odlus VIII, 2).

The Constitutional Court ruled that most clauses of the said law were unconstitutional.

MATEVŽ KRIVIC, lawyer, a former judge of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia (1990-1998)

21 Ruling of the Constitutional Court No. UP-20/93 of 19 June 1997. Also, Ruling of the Supreme Court II Ips 602/97, Ruling of the Supreme Court II Ips 143/98, as in Ruling of the Supreme Court II Ips 38/98).

The Constitutional Court annuls or abrogates other regulations or general acts that are unconstitutional or contrary to law.

This article was subsequently invalidated by the Constitutional Court with the explanation that it restricted freedom of expression.

The office of Constitutional Court judge is not compatible with office in state bodies, in local self-government bodies and in bodies of political parties, and with other offices and activities that are not compatible by law with the office of Constitutional Court judge.

If in deciding on a constitutional complaint the Constitutional Court establishes the unconstitutionality of a regulation or general act, it may in accordance with the provisions of the first paragraph of this article annul or abrogate such regulation or act.

However, the standpoint taken by the Supreme Court at several proceedings involving this issue significantly differs from the standpoints upon which the 1997 resolution of the Constitutional Court was based.

because 'if it's o.k. for it (the state), then that's how it is, but where the people have a say, it is as the state or the government says, or some constitutional court.'

It is precisely this distinction, even though it is not explicitly emphasised in the Constitution, which has, according to the interpretation of the Constitutional Court, legal constitutional significance. The essence of the constitutional right of reply is that a person exercises it in the public and not prevailingly private interest (thus making it a political right in some sense and not a personal right, one could add).

In accordance with the decision of the Constitutional Court, the right of reply exercised by an individual to protect public interests is, in the current Constitution, the only substitute for the former constitutional right that guaranteed the publication of 'opinions of public importance'; therefore 'it would be even more important for this right to be dealt with adequately by legislation, in harmony with constitutional provisions'.

The same ruling of the Constitutional Court includes the explanation that 'in connection with the constitutional right to reply to published information, and taking into account the circumstances and manner in which this constitutional right was established, it is possible to interpret this provision in such a way as to arrive at the conclusion that this constitutional right by itself incorporates - in addition to the usual content that could be ascribed to the concept of 'reply to published information' - a meaningful distinction that sets it apart from the right of correction.

But if a media owner, whoever they may be, decided to dispute this institute at the Constitutional Court on the grounds that it violated freedom of the press, the owner would easily win the case.

In 1999 the Constitutional Court ruled that these two members belonged in the opposition quota, so coalition parties nominated two additional members meaning that they had a 2/3 majority in the Presidium.

The public prosecutor declared the Presidium with only four members from coalition parties unlawful , but the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court (5:6) ruled that it was lawful. In the opinion of the latter, it is better to have half a Presidium than no Presidium at all.

The Constitutional Court decided, however, that the decision of the court was in harmony with both the Law on Public Information and the Constitution, since this law, although older than the Constitution, was in perfect harmony with it, in contrast to the Public Media Act (of a later date) which was not!

With the Constitution referring to two rights and, given the opinion of the Constitutional Court that the equating of these two rights in law would be unconstitutional, the currently proposed media law treats the two rights separately.

However, the Constitutional Court has not yet considered the legitimacy of such a constitutional provision, nor has it looked into the much more important question of whether this right on the one hand, and the duty of the media (print, broadcast, private and public) and journalists on the other, are in harmony with a wider understanding of journalistic freedom and freedom of expression in general.

Based on the ruling of the Constitutional Court in the fall of 1999, the National Assembly adopted the Act Amending the rtv Slovenia Act, which introduced a change in the method of collecting the license fee (renamed contribution therein).

However, the Constitutional Court did not attempt to assess the legitimacy of this constitutional provision, neither did it address an even more important question, i.e. whether this right of a public legal nature on the one hand and the duties of the media (including print, broadcast, public and private media) and journalists on the other are in harmony with the wider understanding of journalistic freedom, and whether the constitutional right of this type actually presents an overstrict interference in the freedom of the media, the independence of editorial policies, and so on.

(2) The Institute shall be governed by the provisions of the Institutes' Act (Official Gazette RS, nos. 12/91, 8/96, and 36/00 - Decision of the Constitutional Court - hereinafter referred to as " ZZ "), unless otherwise provided for in this Act.

Given the fact that the Constitution mentions two rights and that, in the opinion of the Constitutional Court, the equation of both rights in law would be unconstitutional, the current proposed new media law accordingly treats them as two separate rights.

In the process of ratifying a treaty, the Constitutional Court, on the proposal of the President of the Republic, the Government or a third of the deputies of the National Assembly, issues an opinion on the conformity of such treaty with the Constitution.

Repeat elections shall also be held if, in the event of a complaint, the National Assembly or the Constitutional Court does not confirm a deputy's term of office and the republic electoral commission establishes that repeat elections must be held for this reason.

The Secretariat for Legal Issues and Legislation with the National Assembly and the State Secretary at the Ministry of Culture responsible for the media also drew attention to the legal disputability of this proposal. The State Secretary even announced the filing of a complaint with the Constitutional Court.

The Slovene Constitutional Court has pointed out more than once that 'freedom of the press and of expression of opinions are conducive to creating and shaping an impartially informed public; it is a prerequisite for the public's ability to control all branches of authority; and it ensures effective political opposition to any ruling political power.

10 Those interested will find more on this subject in the above-mentioned book Protection of Human Rights, pp. 216-220. Some further interesting legal viewpoints can be found in the ruling of the Slovene Constitutional Court from 1997, for the time being the only one dealing with the freedom of the press (Ruling No. Up-20/ 93, published in Odlus under no. 181 - cf. especially points 23 and 35-42).

However, when this issue was considered by the Constitutional Court in 1997, it adopted a viewpoint which suggested that the distinction of these two rights should continue to be maintained. The Court actually decided that 'the difference between right of reply and right of correction is based primarily on the linguistic and logical interpretation of Article 40 of the Constitution, where the right of correction is tied to the plaintiff's rights being affected while right of reply is not tied to this or any other similar condition.

2 On the web conference the visitors could give their opinion about the following questions: What, in your opinion, should Bajuk's government accomplish before the end of its mandate? What do you think about the support that the group of MPs of SLS+SKD-The Slovenian People's Party, under the leadership of Dr. Franc Zagožen, gave to the constitutional changes through which the proportional system entered the Constitution despite the result of the referendum and the decision of the Constitutional Court which speak in favor of the two-round voting system? Do you support the proposal of the government of RS to reduce the number of ministerial sectors? Do you approve of the publishing of the names of all who did not pay tax? What do you think about the fact that Milan Kučan and Jorg Haider declared that the AVNOJ resolutions were political issue?

It is in fact a fragmentary remnant of the former constitutional right that was contained in Article 167 of the Constitution of the former Yugoslavia, which referred to the right of citizens to publish their opinions of public importance. Of course this constitutional right, of a megalomaniac nature, could not survive the breakup of the system.

12 By a miracle I managed to uphold this constitutional right before the Supreme Court twice in 1984 (in one case against the Delo daily; in the other as a counsel to Bogdan Novak against the Nedeljski dnevnik daily).

As regards these issues, Slovenia could take as an example foreign court decisions which have ruled that the constitutional right of freedom of expression and indiscriminate treatment demands that statecontrolled media also publish state bodies' replies to criticism of their conduct or other controversial issues.

The paradoxical dimension of this event arises above all from the journalist's claim that his constitutional right of reply was violated because the court's decision was based on the then valid Law on Public Information, but this law (being older than the Constitution) was allegedly in conflict with the current Constitution (i.e. Article 40 defining the right of correction and right of reply).

In my opinion, the court would be justified in denying legal protection to the right of reply in cases where a reply denies or supplements information which is completely unimportant for the public - or has such minor importance that the protection of freedom of the press (freedom of a publisher to shape content according to its own interests) prevails over the gravity of the infringement of constitutional provisions.

Ensure the independence of the Romanian Court of Accounts through a constitutional amendment in line with international standards as regards the organisation of supreme audit institutions.

Those fundamental rights are to be interpreted, under the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, in the light of Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the constitutional traditions common to the Member States.