In order to assess the foreseeable impact(12) of a merger on the relevant markets, the Commission analyses its possible anti-competitive effects and the relevant countervailing factors such as buyer power, the extent of entry barriers and possible efficiencies put forward by the parties.

For an example of pipeline products of one merging party likely to compete with the other party's pipeline or existing products, see, e.g. Case IV/M.1846 - Glaxo Wellcome/SmithKline Beecham, point 188.

This Form specifies the information that must be provided by notifying parties when submitting a notification to the European Commission of a proposed merger, acquisition or other concentration.

For such a demerger, the undertakings concerned (for each break-up operation) will be, on the one hand, the original parties to the merger and, on the other, the assets that each original party is acquiring.

Normally a viable business is an existing one that can operate on a stand-alone-basis, which means independently of the merging parties as regards the supply of input materials or other forms of cooperation other than during a transitory period.

Furthermore, the parties must maintain the same conditions of competition as regards the divestiture package as those applied before the merger, so as to continue the business as it is currently conducted.

In the case of mergers or joint acquisitions, or in other cases where the reasoned submission is completed by more than one of the parties, business secrets may be submitted in separate annexes, and referred to in the submission as an annex.

If parties submit incorrect information, the Commission will have the power to revoke any Article 6 or 8 decision it adopts following an Article 4(5) referral, pursuant to Article 6(3)(a) or 8(6)(a) of the EC Merger Regulation.

Article 14(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation provides that incorrect or misleading information, where supplied intentionally or negligently, can make the notifying party or parties liable to fines of up to ECU 50 000.

To this end, the parties are required to show clearly, to the Commission's satisfaction in accordance with its obligations under the Merger Regulation, that the remedy restores conditions of effective competition in the common market on a permanent basis.

Where the parties submit proposals for commitments together with the notification or within three weeks from the date of receipt of the notification(39), the deadline for the Commission's decision pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Merger Regulation is extended from one month to six weeks.

Under Article 14(1)(a) of the EC Merger Regulation, notifying parties who, either intentionally or negligently, supply incorrect or misleading information, may be liable to fines of up to 1 % of the aggregate turnover of the undertaking concerned.

In such circumstances, the Commission will not clear the merger unless the parties undertake not to complete the notified operation before having entered into a binding agreement with a purchaser for the divested business (known as the "upfront buyer"), approved by the Commission(24).

This Form specifies the information that requesting parties should provide when making a reasoned submission for a pre-notification referral under Article 4(4) or (5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (hereinafter referred to as "the EC Merger Regulation").

If the parties to the concentration, and/or other involved parties (including the seller and minority shareholders), enter into ancillary restrictions directly related and necessary to the implementation of the concentration, these restrictions may be assessed in conjunction with the concentration itself (see Article 6(1)(b) and Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation, recital 25 to the Merger Regulation, recital 7 to Regulation (EC) No 1310/97 and the Commission notice on restrictions ancillary to concentrations) (20).

In concentrations other than mergers or the setting-up of new joint ventures, i. e. in cases of sole or joint acquisition of pre-existing companies or parts of them, there is an important party to the agreement that gives rise to the operation who is to be ignored when identifying the undertakings concerned:

When market conditions are such that the competitors of the merging parties are unlikely to increase their supply substantially if prices increase, the merging firms may have an incentive to reduce output below the combined pre-merger levels, thereby raising market prices(44).

if no active market exists, on a basis that reflects the amount that the enterprise would have paid for the asset in an arm's length transaction between knowledgeable willing parties, based on the best information available (see IAS 38 for further guidance on determining the fair value of an intangible asset acquired in a business combination);

In order to limit the time and expense involved in complying with various merger control procedures in several individual countries, the European Union has put in place a system of merger control by which concentrations having a Community dimension (normally, where the parties to the concentration fulfil certain turnover thresholds)(2) are assessed by the European Commission in a single procedure (the "one stop shop" principle).