(3) In the case of merger or division referred to in the first or second paragraph of this Article, the receiving company may, in addition to the issue or transfer of securities, make a cash payment not exceeding 10 % of the nominal value or, in the absence of a nominal value, of the accounting value of the securities.

All the available documents and the actual use of the land having been taken into consideration, the extent of the land that was obtained for construction shall first be determined in the merger procedure, and then a new parcel partitioning of the entire area shall be carried out in consideration of all the documents and circumstances such that the use of all the buildings is facilitated and the function of all public areas is preserved.

Before the merger, the market shares of the merging firms contribute to the HHI by their squares individually:

For example, a merger of two firms with market shares of 30 % and 15 % respectively would increase the HHI by 900 (30 × 15 × 2 = 900).

the mutual recognition of companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 48, the retention of legal personality in the event of transfer of their seat from one country to another, and the possibility of mergers between companies or firms governed by the laws of different countries;

1.For the purposes of the first subparagraph of Article 33(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003, «merger» shall mean the merger of two or more separate farmers within the meaning of Article 2 (a) of Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 into one new farmer within the meaning of Article 2 (a) of Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 controlled in terms of management, benefits and financial risks by the farmers originally managing the holdings or one of them.

(3) If a bank exceeds the maximum permissible exposure specified in the first and second paragraphs of this article owing to a merger of two legal persons or owing to other reasons over which it has no influence, it must without delay notify the Bank of Slovenia of such.

The merged firm may be in a position to obtain lower prices by reducing its purchase of inputs.

The merger increases the incentive to reduce output by giving the merged firm a larger base of sales on which to enjoy the higher margins resulting from an increase in prices induced by the output reduction.

If the merged firm were to adopt strategies similar to those of other competitors, the remaining firms would find it easier to coordinate, and the merger would increase the likelihood, stability or effectiveness of coordination.

Some proposed mergers would, if allowed to proceed, significantly impede effective competition by leaving the merged firm in a position where it would have the ability and incentive to make the expansion of smaller firms and potential competitors more difficult or otherwise restrict the ability of rival firms to compete.

A merger may also make coordination easier, more stable or more effective for firms which were coordinating prior to the merger (coordinated effects).

The most direct effect of the merger will be the loss of competition between the merging firms.

Third, in the absence of a merger, the assets of the failing firm would inevitably exit the market fn.

Through its control of mergers, the Commission prevents mergers that would be likely to deprive customers of these benefits by significantly increasing the market power of firms.

Before the merger, the market shares of the merging firms contribute to the HHI by their squares individually:

A merger may also make coordination easier, more stable or more effective for firms, that were already coordinating before the merger, either by making the coordination more robust or by permitting firms to coordinate on even higher prices.

For example, a merger of two firms with market shares of 30 % and 15 % respectively would increase the HHI by 900 (30 × 15 × 2 = 900).

For example, if prior to the merger one of the merging firms had raised its price, it would have lost some sales to the other merging firm.

In other words, the surviving firm in a merger or takeover of a safe harbor organization by this method would be bound by the latter's safe harbor commitments.

The Commission may decide that an otherwise problematic merger is nevertheless compatible with the common market if one of the merging parties is a failing firm.

A merger involving such a firm may change the competitive dynamics in a significant, anti-competitive way, in particular when the market is already concentrated fn.

Generally, a merger giving rise to such non-coordinated effects would significantly impede effective competition by creating or strengthening the dominant position of a single firm, one which, typically, would have an appreciably larger market share than the next competitor post-merger.

It may, in particular, take account of the likely entry or exit of firms if the merger did not take place when considering what constitutes the relevant comparison fn.

A merger involving a firm whose market share will remain below 50 % after the merger may also raise competition concerns in view of other factors such as the strength and number of competitors, the presence of capacity constraints or the extent to which the products of the merging parties are close substitutes.

Non-merging firms in the same market can also benefit from the reduction of competitive pressure that results from the merger, since the merging firms' price increase may switch some demand to the rival firms, which, in turn, may find it profitable to increase their prices fn.

For example, a merger between two producers offering products which a substantial number of customers regard as their first and second choices could generate a significant price increase.

In assessing whether or not a merger may increase the symmetry of the various firms present on the market, efficiency gains may provide important indications (see also paragraph 82 of the notice).

For instance, the merged entity may have such a degree of control, or influence over, the supply of inputs fn or distribution possibilities fn that expansion or entry by rival firms may be more costly.

Moreover, even if the merger or takeover were effectuated through the acquisition of assets, the liabilities of the acquired enterprise could nevertheless bind the acquiring firm in certain circumstances.

The incentive on the part of the merged entity to pass efficiency gains on to consumers is often related to the existence of competitive pressure from the remaining firms in the market and from potential entry.

The Article 29 Working Party expressed concern over situations where an organization within the safe harbor is taken over by, or merged with, a firm which has not made a commitment to follow the safe harbor principles.

The Commission has thus in several cases considered mergers resulting in firms holding market shares between 40 % and 50 % fn, and in some cases below 40 % fn, to lead to the creation or the strengthening of a dominant position

A merger with a potential competitor can generate horizontal anti-competitive effects, whether coordinated or non-coordinated, if the potential competitor significantly constrains the behaviour of the firms active in the market.

The creation or strengthening of a dominant position held by a single firm as a result of a merger has been the most common basis for finding that a concentration would result in a significant impediment to effective competition.

In markets where innovation is an important competitive force, a merger may increase the firms' ability and incentive to bring new innovations to the market and, thereby, the competitive pressure on rivals to innovate in that market.

First, specific procedures for mergers and divisions involving credit institutions were introduced by Regulation ECB/2000/8 of 31 August 2000 fn in order to clarify the obligations of these institutions in respect of minimum reserves.

In the context of coordinated effects, efficiencies may increase the merged entity's incentive to increase production and reduce prices, and thereby reduce its incentive to coordinate its market behaviour with other firms in the market.

This formal guidance on the interpretation of Article 3 should enable firms to establish more quickly, in advance of any contact with the Commission, whether and to what extent their operations may be covered by Community merger control.

The Commission's interpretation of Article 3 of the Merger Regulation with respect to joint ventures is without prejudice to the interpretation which may be given by the Court of Justice or the Court of First Instance of the European Communities.

The Commission's interpretation of the Merger Regulation as regards the appraisal of horizontal mergers is without prejudice to the interpretation which may be given by the Court of Justice or the Court of First Instance of the European Communities.

First, several undertakings must merge, or one or more undertakings must acquire control of the whole or part of other undertakings through the proposed operation, which must qualify as a concentration within the meaning of Article 3 of the Regulation.

For the purpose of access to the quantity referred to in the first indent of Article 2(2) a company formed by the merger of companies each having rights to apply pursuant to that indent shall enjoy the same rights as the companies from which they were formed.